Using the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey data, the paper examines Russian workers' fear of unemployment under different economic and labour market conditions during the last 15 years. We employ two alternative measures for this fear. The first one looks at the workers' fear of losing their current jobs, while the second deals with the fear of not finding relevant reemployment in case of displacement. In order to get the best possible measurement of unemployment for those local and social environments where our respondents live and work, we design unemployment rates for narrowly defined regional and demographic (peer) groups. Estimating ordered probit models for both fear measures, and controlling for various worker and job characteristics, we do not find significant causal effects of unemployment on these fears in most of our specifications. These results are robust to exclusion of potentially endogenous variables; they hold for different periods, subsamples, and levels of job security. Moreover, our simulations show that even a large increase in the unemployment rate has little impact on conditional probabilities of expressing a strong or weak fear of unemployment. These results suggest that the high level and persistence of fear of unemployment in Russia may be caused by non-economic factors.
Introduction
Economists are interested not only in actual dynamics, factors, and consequences of unemployment, but in subjective perceptions and expectations of unemployment as well. Fear of unemployment is one such perception and it affects human behavior. As some recent studies show, fear of unemployment may decrease wages (Blanchflower, 1991; Aaronson and Sullivan, 1998; Campbell et al., 2007; Blanchflower and Shadforth, 2007) , contain consumption (Stephens, 2004; Benito, 2006) , negatively affect health (Burgard et al., 2009 ), suppress subjective well-being, and complicate family relations (Burchell, 1994) , among other things.
The distribution of unemployment fear across the population is also of high importance. programs and support of the unemployed can get additional funds from the state coffers. Large enterprises can exploit this fear in order to lobby for subsidies from the government and pressure workers for wage concessions. 6 These results motivate research in factors that may drive these fears. As multiple studies on this issue show, fear of unemployment varies across social and demographic groups (e.g., This paper considers the case of Russia, where the link between actual unemployment and individual fearfulness can be weak or seriously muted. On the one hand, economic development over the last 20 years was extremely bumpy, with large swings in the GDP growth followed by increases (or decreases, correspondingly) in the unemployment rate. On the other hand, as available survey evidence suggests, workers' subjective perceptions of job instability were highly inertial and showed little reaction to actual trends.
In 1998-2000, against the background of the rapid post-crisis recovery, the unemployment rate decreased from almost 14% to less than 9%. Meanwhile, most of the workers that were afraid of losing jobs in 1998 retained the same level of fear in 2000. In the years that followed (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) , strong economic growth reduced unemployment further to a mere 6%, while the proportion of those afraid decreased just slightly and never went below 50%. This proportion of fearful people appeared to be very high by international standards. In addition, the inertia of the strong fear of unemployment in Russian society in this period manifested despite articulated political efforts to "preserve stability" in all dimensions of social life, including job protection.
The fear of unemployment among Russian workers and its tentative determinants were explored earlier in Gimpelson et al. (2003) and Linz and Semykina (2008) . Findings from these two papers note some anomalies that mark the Russian labor market in comparison to the labor markets in more advanced economies. For example, in Russia this fear is not gender neutral (women are more fearful in this respect than men are) and it increases over age and tenure (in 6 For example, the Russian government, being afraid of social protests and of losing popularity as a consequence of mass displacements, was ready to bail out potentially bankrupt firms. In September 2009, the largest Russian carmaker AVTOVAZ announced forthcoming mass layoffs (staff cuts by 30%). The government intervened immediately to ban these plans, since it was afraid of the social and political consequences [Vedomosti, 9.10.09]. As a result, the firm received a massive financial bailout.
most countries, job tenure increases job protection). As to the relationship between actual labor market conditions and unemployment fear, the authors of both papers conclude that it did not appear early in the transition but became statistically significant later on. However, these papers did not consider the period after 2004, when fears remained high despite rapid economic growth and further unemployment decline.
In this paper, using household data, we study the association between actual unemployment The key finding of our study is that unemployment-related fearfulness of workers is weakly linked to the actual unemployment rate. These results are robust to exclusion of potentially endogenous variables; they hold for different periods, subsamples and regardless of variation in levels of jobs security. Even if an association exists, the practical impact of unemployment on perceptions is subtle. As simulations show, drastically large fluctuations in unemployment add practically little to intensity of fears. These results allow suggest that the high level and persistence of fear of unemployment in Russia may be caused by non-economic factors.
The next section presents the story of the Russian labor market over the period of 2000-09 and how it is reflected in subjective perceptions. Section 3 explains our research methodology and empirical data. A descriptive analysis of the fear-related variables is provided in Section 4.
Sections 5 and 6 discuss findings from the econometric analysis. In the conclusion, we sum up our major findings and outline further research efforts.
Labour Market Trends and Institutional Change: Could They
Affect Fear of Unemployment?
Main trends
Soon after the financial crisis of 1998, the unemployment rate reached a record high of 14.6%. However, in early 1999 it started to decline rapidly, thus reacting to the economy's return onto a path of growth. Meanwhile, the economic recovery affected all other labour market indicators as well. The employment to population (e/p) ratio increased by 5 pp, previously accumulated wage arrears decreased, the incidence of underemployment decreased, and the number of annual hours worked increased. The problem of excess employment, which was typical for many firms in the 1990s, was replaced by its opposite -the widely publicized "threat of total labor shortage». 8 Hiring rates stayed high and were positively correlated with vacancy rates. But the most impressive labor market development was presented by the real wage growth, which, according to the Russian Statistical Service (Rosstat), was an annual 12-15% over the whole period. As a result, by 2008 the Russian labor market looked completely differently than in 1999 or 2000 and any worker could easily feel it. All these achievements were widely propagated by politicians and media and were well known to everybody. These developments should have weakened a potential fear of unemployment.
Of course, a more detailed look could paint a less optimistic picture. The number of those employed in the corporate sector (= protected by the EPL) decreased from 52 million workers to about 48 million or by 7-8 pp. The proportion of workers in volatile jobs -temporary or casualincreased, as did the informal sector employment. In other words, the proportion of workers in various "bad" jobs rose continuously (Non-standard Employment in the Russian Economy, 2007; Lehmann et al., 2011) . Though this dimension of the labor market development was rarely discussed by politicians and in leading media, it was well known to every Russian as well. Many workers had their own first-hand experience of volatile employment and this could implicitly feed feelings of insecurity and anxiety. However, persistently high hiring rates meant that losing an insecure job was quite easily compensated by finding a new one similar to the former position. Kapeliushnikov, 2011). The expectation of mass dismissals in large firms became a new focus of media attention and a factor of growing public concern. Nevertheless, this grim period was rather short and all indicators soon (in 2010) improved, signaling that the major threat had passed by.
Summing up, most of the actual labour market trends over this period should have cushioned fears, though some developments could have an ambiguous impact on subjective perceptions. Objective causes for more fearfulness emerged by the end of the period under study.
This balance could, of course, vary across social and demographic groups of employees.
Institutional Changes
Major labour market institutions were largely shaped in the early 1990s and with some modifications survived throughout the 2000s. The Russian authorities have never considered this policy area an explicit priority. Their implicit goal in the institution building was to prevent mass downsizing of the labor force which was considered a threat to political stability. In the 1990-es, both the minimum wage and the UB replacement ratio remained low, and the variable part of the labor compensation became tied to the economic performance of firms. This framework simultaneously eject low productive workers out of jobs. Since the rapid average wage growth was associated with a decrease in the UB replacement ratio 10 , the total costs of unemployment to workers tended to rise.
This part of the story suggests that institutional changes were not clear-cut from the point of their impact on subjective insecurity.
Level and Dynamics of Unemployment Fears
Now we turn to the fears themselves. Fig. 1 presents the evolution of the two RLMSbased indicators (more on data issues see in Section 3) for subjective perceptions of insecurity in the Russian labor market during 1994-2009. The first reflects the proportion of those who fear losing their job (the proportion of workers who said they were very concerned or concerned with potential job loss) and the second one shows the proportion of those who fear not finding a new job of comparable quality (the proportion of workers who said they were absolutely unsure or somewhat unsure they would find a job of comparable quality if they were fired).
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As Fig. 1 suggests, throughout the whole transition period the subjective insecurity in Russia was largely stable. It stayed high compared to other countries ( Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 ). The proportion of those who feared losing their jobs was persistently above 50%. To compare: in the 1990s, in the USA and the UK, the proportion of workers who feared losing their jobs was under 10% (e.g., Aaronson and Sullivan, 1998; Campbell et al. 2007 ). This fits the general crosscountry picture showing that the level of fear among Russian workers is much stronger than in developed countries under the given rate of unemployment (Gimpelson and Monusova, 2009 ).
Moreover, the rigid EPL in Russia clearly contrasts to the much more liberal regulations in the US or the UK. 12 Russians' fear of losing their jobs is similar to workers in Latin America (Fig. 3) where the rigid EPL only covers the relatively small formal sector and modern unemployment protection is almost non-existent (Graham, 2002) .
The positive association between the stringency of job protection and the level of fear that we observe may seem counterintuitive. However, strong fear of unemployment (regardless of its origin) can boost demand for stricter EPL. Stricter EPL, if delivered by politicians, in turn suppresses job creation and increases pressure on workers in times of crisis. The latter may have a further impact on subjective insecurity thus closing the circle (Wasmer, 2006 ). 10 Unemployment benefits were raised notably in the beginning of 2009 as an anti-crisis measure. 11 For more details about the RLMS and variables used in this study see Section 3. concerning finding a new job after being fired were even more stable over time. This provides additional evidence that subjective perception of job security seems to be inertial and somewhat sheltered from external objective circumstances.
The discussion presented above brings us to our main hypothesis that subjective perceptions of unemployment in Russia are not caused by actual labour market developments. In the following paragraphs we will test this proposition and discuss potential implications.
Methodology and Data
Our study uses microdata from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). The RLMS is the only representative household survey in Russia containing a wide set of questions on labour activity, including questions about unemployment-related fears. We exploit the pooled data set containing all waves from 1994 to 2009.
The empirical strategy is based on estimation of the following equation:
The LHS variable (Fear it ) can be measured using two different survey questions (see below). We are interested in a causal effect between this variable and the actual unemployment rate (U). Index i stands for individual, j for region (or specific peer group), for which unemployment is measured, and t for year. We control for individual characteristics of workers . 15 We estimate the model (1) using the ordered probit technique and do it separately for both questions since they differ in nuance. As shown above, in the 1990s, the indexes based on these questions moved almost identically. In the second half of the 2000s, they started to diverge and for older workers, this was especially the case.
Both questions are asked in all RLMS waves and have already been used to study subjective insecurity in Russia. 16 The wording of the questions is similar to those used in other As an alternative, we calculate group-specific unemployment and non-employment rates.
For doing this using LFS micro-data, we form multiple groups as simultaneous breakdowns by region*urban/rural*gender*education variables. Altogether we get 496 specific groups. For each group and for each year (in the RLMS survey), we calculated unemployment rate (as % of unemployed in economically active population in the group) and non-employment rate (as % of non-employed in the total population in the group). 17 We can do this because the LFS sample is much larger than the RLMS sample. Then we impute these values to every respondent in our RLMS sample and use these group-specific labour market indicators in our base specifications.
They have much larger variation than standard regional unemployment rates have.
We measure former unemployment experience using two dummy variables. The first equals 1 if our respondent was unemployed at least once over the survey period, and to 0 otherwise. The second equals 1 if a respondent was unemployed in the previous wave and to 0 otherwise. 18 We control for individual characteristics (gender, age and age squared, education, marital status, occupation, getting a pension, tenure and tenure squared, having a second job, and type of residence) and for job characteristics (firm size, having subordinates, having wage arrears). The macro-region where our respondents reside is also controlled.
If the first group of variables (individual characteristics) reflects the bargaining power of individuals on the labour market, the second one (job characteristics) measures risks associated with the quality of these jobs. One could assume that fear of job loss tends to be lower for employees working in the public sector than in the private sector, lower for workers at large enterprises than at small ones, and lower for those working formally than those informally 19 .
The extent to what workers fear losing their jobs can be affected not just by the likelihood of losing their job, but also by the costs associated with the loss for a worker. For example, these costs may be lower if a worker has alternative income sources (a second job or a pension).
The descriptive statistics for all repressors used in the paper is presented in Tab. 1. We restrict the sample to individuals who were between the ages of 15 and 72 in the year of observation. Two sub-periods considered in the paper (1994-1998 and 2000-2008) reveal some important differences. In the second sub-period, the proportion of employed by the state kept declining, but the unemployment rate and the incidence of wage arrears went down quickly. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for FEAR_1 and FEAR_2 across major groups of workers.
Descriptive analysis of fear
Individual characteristics. Fear of unemployment varies by gender and age groups.
FEAR_1 is inversely U-shaped over age. The strongest fear was in the age group of 46-59 years old. Here, 63% of workers in the first sub-period and 55% in the second one feared losing their jobs. For workers over 59 years old, these proportions were smaller by 13 and 10 pp. This corresponds with the fact that unemployment-related risks seem to be the highest for the prepension age but then with age they go down due to the appearance of alternative (pension)
income. The proportion of those fearful of job loss in the 30-45 age group decreased by 12 pp between the two sub-periods, and this decrease was largest among all age groups.
On the contrary, fear of not finding a job (FEAR_2) changes monotonically with age and reaches the maximum in the pension age group. The decrease in this fear over time (between the sub-periods) was largest (by 20 pp) for the youngest age group and smallest (by 8 pp) for the oldest.
Women compared to men are more afraid of losing job but the gender gap is lower in the second sub-period. The same is true in case of fears associated with job search.
Increased educational levels weaken fears and reduce between-group differences. In the 1990s, higher education was associated with significantly lower fears, but this difference largely evaporated in the 2000. Those respondents who have families tend to have stronger fear than those without, though the difference is of low significance.
Rural residents report greater fear than urban residents: among the latter, residents of Moscow and Saint Petersburg are least likely to report unemployment fear. These differences in perceptions may reflect differences in access to jobs as well as differences in human capital endowments.
Having a second job that can indirectly mirror labour market competiveness (through alternative or complementary professional skills) expectedly weakens fears. In case of job loss, the availability of alternative income decreases the costs of temporary joblessness and of the job search. On the contrary, wage arrears, if they exist, reflect both a worker's low market power and job volatility.
Job characteristics. One could expect that occupying a better-protected job would reduce anxiety about its potential loss. However, the data do not suggest that better protected jobs (located in the public sector, in large firms, and with fully formal labour contracts) are associated with weaker fears.
State sector workers are more prone to stronger fears than workers in the private sector are.
These differences are even more pronounced in the case of job search (var. FEAR_2). As an employer, the state is expected to provide more secure jobs, and workers are expected to feel this security. Even more counterintuitive is the evidence that informal workers (those without a formal contract) seem to have a weaker fear of job loss. In the 2000s, in this group both variables of fear had the lowest values among all groups that are presented in Table 2 . The level of fear shows little variation by firm size: workers at large firms perceive job insecurity as much as workers at small firms do.
Having subordinates correlates with lower anxiety. On the one hand, this factor reflects a worker's hierarchical status; on the other, more energetic and able workers are likely to be nonrandomly selected to such positions. Unconditional averages suggest that less competitive and more risk-averse workers are more likely to end up in better-protected jobs. 20 Individuals with a particular set of observable and non-observable characteristics tend to be concentrated in particular types of jobs. Driven by their preferences, workers may accept lower wages, thus providing arguments for the theory of compensating differentials. In our case, fear of job loss can motivate workers to minimize labour market risks and therefore to encourage them to search for more secure jobs (in the public sector, large firms, and with formal contracts). This kind of sorting reduces the aggregate fear level, which could otherwise be higher (if workers were randomly assigned accross protected and unprotected positions).
in case of random assignment of workers across protected and unprotected positions). As our previous research shows, public sector jobs and better protected jobs in Russia are associated with lower earnings.
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Labour market characteristics. Since unemployment and non-employment are continuous variables, we divide their distributions into quartiles (p25, p50, p75). These quartiles are 20 About labour market sorting see, for example, Krueger and Schkade (2008) . 21 Gimpelson and Lukyianova (2009).
associated with different situations that can be called low, medium, and high unemployment (Table 3) . Though rising unemployment and non-employment tend to drive fears up, the associated increase in fears is not proportional to unemployment growth. For example, shifts from the low value of group-specific unemployment to the high value in the first sub-period was accompanied by weakening fears (potentially due to some social learning) and by strengthening fears by 5 pp in the second sub-period. Unconditional effects of group-specific unemployment rates do not emerge as strong either.
Determinants of Fear
So far we have presented unconditional averages for fears by social and demographic groups of workers. In this paragraph we present econometric estimates of effects of unemployment conditional on other factors. We estimate Eq (1) separately for FEAR_1 and FEAR_2 and for two sub-periods, of which one is for the deep economic decline (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) while the other is for remarkable growth (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . For each of the two dependent variables we use three specifications, differing in the way the local labour market situation is described.
This description is presented consequently by regional unemployment rates, group-specific unemployment, and non-employment. We estimate standard errors accounting for potential clustering across individuals. Table 4 presents estimations of the Eq1 with FEAR_1 as the dependent variable. We estimate it for the both sub-periods pooling the data within each sub-period. 22 There is a strong gender gap in the first sub-period: women seemed to have much stronger fear than men did. In the second sub-period, the gap tended to shrink but remained statistically significant. The inverse U-type relationship revealed by the descriptive analysis is confirmed for the both sub-periods.
Fear of Job Loss
While in 1994-98 tertiary education reduced job loss related fears, in the 2000s this factor lost its significance, probably due to a large increase in the supply of skilled labour and growing over- opportunities undermine worker's bargaining power at the current job. In the second sub-period, this effect became even stronger.
In 1994-98, employment in state-owned firms was not associated with fear of job loss, but the expected negative relationship emerged later. During the later period, the proportion of stateowned sector employment reduced, while the EPL enforcement in this sector became stronger.
Workers more predisposed to stronger anxiety can self-select the public sector, bringing some endogeneity into the ownership variable. If this were not true, the negative relationship could be even stronger.
Workers employed by large firms tend to fear unemployment more than those employed by small or medium-sized firms. This result holds when we exclude the ownership dummy variable.
Again, one could expect to see the contrary, since jobs at large firms are usually better protected.
However, large firms in Russia that are traditionally known for labour hoarding downsized more quickly, thus putting more psychological pressure on their workers. Here again we may see a non-random selection of low-competitive workers with stronger fears of job loss (and therefore a preference for more job security) to larger firms.
Interestingly, workers with formal labour contracts show stronger fears than those having informal agreements only. This outcome is robust on all available cross-sections (1998, 2000, (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) and is reproduced if the relevant dummy is added to the complete specification on the 2002-2008 pool. This is even stronger evidence on self-selection than those mentioned earlier.
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Fear of job loss is expectedly stronger among rural residents than among urban residents, and in largest cities it is the weakest. This is explained by the simple fact that the fear of job loss weakens as job opportunities expand. Being a supervisor for other workers, as a rule, adds power and reflects a relative value of such worker for a firm. Wage arrears were associated with stronger fears in the first sub-period as an indirect indication of bad financial situation at his/her firm as well as his/her relative value for employer. However, the sharply decreased incidence of wage arrears in the second sub-period made this factor statistically insignificant.
How did local labor markets affect feelings of fear? Do signals sent by actual unemployment to workers strengthen or weaken subjective insecurity? As we show further, these signals if accepted by workers turn out to be of weak influence.
As already noted, we use three different indicators of local labour market conditions. In the first sub-period, coefficients for all of these indicators were negative and of no significance. In the second sub-period, all coefficients become positive, but only the coefficient for group- 23 We do not present tables with these findings for the sake of saving space. The informal sector dummies are available for selected years only.
specific non-employment achieves significance. 24 Does higher unemployment transpire into stronger perceptions of insecurity? In order to answer this question, getting just statistical significance is not enough and we are interested in practical significance as well.
The associations between fear of unemployment and personal experience of unemployment (given that all other variables are controlled for) are presented in Table 5 . We present them in a separate table since inclusion of the variables for personal experience significantly reduces the sample. The association is insignificant regardless of which indicator of previous experience is used. This finding is reproduced in all specifications, including annual cross-sections.
Meanwhile, statistical significance for various unemployment variables is not changed (see Section 6).
Fear of not finding a job
The estimates from Eq. (1) for the alternative variable of fear (fear of not finding a new job or FEAR_2) largely reproduce the results presented above (Table 6 ), though with some nuances.
Women are more likely than men to fear not finding a new job. The age effect in the second sub-period disappears, and marital status has no effect in the either period. Place of residence place: urban residents fear job finding difficulties less than rural residents do, and residents of Moscow and Saint Petersburg fear not finding a new job even less. In the first subperiod, tertiary education only affected fear negatively and this effect did not hold when variables for group-specific unemployment or non-employment were included. In the second sub-period, workers with primary vocational education were least afraid of not finding reemployment, while those without general secondary were most afraid. The latter group differs significantly from all others. Getting a pension or secondary job provide additional «secured» income that decreases job search costs. In the first period, personal exposure to wage arrears was among the determinants of fear, but this effect disappeared in the second sub-period.
Effect of job characteristics of jobs on fear is ambiguous. Workers in small firms fear less and probably are used to more frequent mobility and job change. Belonging to state owned firms does not matter. Now let us turn to the labour market indicators. In the first sub-period, they were statistically insignificant, but later they became significant with the expected sign. However, only two of three specifications (with regional unemployment and group-specific nonemployment) remained significant if standard errors are estimated as robust. 24 The changing direction of influence coincides with findings from other studies, e.g. Gimpelson et al (2003) and Linz and Semykina (2008) . This can be interpreted as an outcome of intensive social learning that took place during the period.
Being unemployed in the past strengthens fears of not finding a new job significantly, other things equal (see Table 7 ). Those who have already faced reemployment after being unemployed are likely to better understand the associated costs. Using the alternative variable that reflects unemployment status one year before the survey period confirms this association (between the UN experience and FEAR_2).
Robustness of estimates
We also test alternative specifications, excluding all those variables that are potentially endogenous. Though our unemployment variables are exogenous and are not associated with individual and job characteristics, their coefficients estimates can be potentially contaminated by endogeneity of characteristics as firm size, type of labour contract, job tenure, exposure to wage arrears, among others. Estimation of this reduced specification gives basically unchanged results for unemployment coefficients (in order to save space here, we do not present these estimates, but they are available upon request).
As an alternative robustness check, we estimated our regressions separately for groups of workers with different employment protections. One could expect that unemployment would have a smaller effect on fears if jobs are well protected. In order to differentiate workers by job security, we used two major criteria, ownership (state vs. private) and firm size (fewer than 50 workers vs. over 500 workers), and their interaction. We assume that employment protection in small private firms is weaker than in large state-owned companies. Estimates presented in Tables   8-9 show that the impact of unemployment on fears remains insignificant in all specifications and they are close to the estimates for the total sample. These results seem unexpected and may suggest that fearfulness causes implicit sorting of workers across protected and non-protected jobs.
The fact that estimates are stable over time also point to their robustness. Since we consider the long period (1994-2009) that includes different sub-periods with contrasting macroeconomic regimes, the impact of actual unemployment could vary over time. Though coefficients are insignificant on the pooled sample, they may be significant for particular years.
We show the corresponding estimates in Table 10 . For convenience of comparison, we also present the estimates for both pooled sub-periods. In any year of the first sub-period, the effect of unemployment on either fear was insignificant and close to the estimate on the pooled sample.
In the second sub-period, the impact of regional unemployment on fear of losing job was insignificant in 7 cases of 10, the impact of group-specific unemployment was insignificant in 9 cases of 10, and the impact of group-specific non-employment was insignificant in 6 cases of 10.
The same outcomes were observed for fear of not finding a job. These results indicate that our estimates based on the pooled data reflect inter-temporal story quite correctly.
Dynamics of Fears
Our equations include another important parameter that consistently retains a high value in all specifications. This is the time effect (year of the survey). Being purged of the influence of individual characteristics, characteristics of jobs and unemployment rates, it can be interpreted as reflecting the influence of the social atmosphere in the society in the given year. If comparing actual unemployment with a thunderstorm (the latter can be stronger or weaker), then the time effect can be compared with expectation of a thunderstorm. The expectations can be shaped by scientific forecasts as well as by erroneous information based on prejudices. Meanwhile, these erroneous visions can be deliberately disseminated, or they can evolve spontaneously. In this sense, the time effect in our setting is a measure of social stability in the society in the given year as an expectation of an unemployment "thunderstorm" that may never occur. Estimates for time effects as proxies for social stability increased dramatically, signaling that the population expected a strong "thunderstorm". Note that this was an expectation only, since the 
Impact of Unemployment: How Large is It?
The data presented above allows us to conclude that actual unemployment does not unambiguously emerge as a strong factor generating fear of unemployment, though in a few specifications its effect is statistically significant. Given specific features of the ordered probit model, we cannot interpret the coefficients as explicit elasticities. In order to get some sense of practical effect of unemployment on fear, we calculate conditional probabilities of choosing various positions on the fear scales. We let unemployment vary while keeping all other right hand variables equal to sample means.
Since between-group and over-time variation in choosing the position 4 is quite small, we focus on choosing the position 5 which is more sensitive to changes in external factors.
Estimated differences in average conditional probabilities for choosing pos. 5 for all unemployment variables, given that individual and job characteristics are controlled for, are presented on Fig. 5-6 . Let us assume that the unemployment level changed instantly from its rate that was equal to the 25th percentile in the distribution to the rate of the 75 th percentile, given that all other characteristics are fixed. This would be a very large and shocking change in the labour market. In the first sub-period, this simulated jump would transfer our respondents from a labour market with specific unemployment of 6,6% into the market with 14,1% of unemployment. However, the probability of entering the group with the maximal level of fear would hardly change (see Fig. 5 ). In other words, the reaction to change in external environment would be very weak (but negative!). One could speculate that in the 1990s, the Russians faced the unemployment problem for the first time in their personal life and had little experience in dealing with it. The increase in unemployment in that period was accompanied for the population with intensive social learning that led to forming more rational perceptions.
In the second sub-period, the effect of unemployment on the fear of job loss became positive but remained very little in its magnitude. At that time, the unemployment in Russia declined. Its move from 14,1% to 4,3% would cause a decrease in conditional probability for fear of losing job by a hardly visible 0,08 pp.
How did the fear of not finding a job react? This reaction would also be very subtle. In the first sub-period, an increase in regional unemployment from 7,9 to 11,5% would increase conditional probability of the maximal level of fear from 36,6% to 37,5%, or less than by 1 pp.
However, a change in the specific unemployment from 6,6% to 14,1% would cause no effect on the level of fear. An increase in the specific non-employment from 24,9 to 68,4% would increase probability of the fear by 0,5 pp. In the second sub-period, the reaction of interest remained weak. Thus, doubling the regional unemployment was associated with an increase in the probability of fear of not finding a job by 2,7 pp (from 19,2 to 21,9%). The response from the specific unemployment was much weaker: a jump in unemployment from 4,3% to 13,2% caused an increase in the probability by just 0,5 pp. However, tripling the specific non-employment rate (from 26,9% to 75,7%) increased this probability by 6,8 pp. Note that all these simulated changes in labour market conditions are dramatic and unrealistically large in their magnitude.
This serves as an additional illustration for the fact that expected reactions of unemployment on fears remain weak in practical terms, even if they are statistically significant. What affects these fears? We look at three groups of variables: i) individual characteristics of workers, ii) job-related characteristics, and iii) labour market characteristics. Better-educated workers, younger workers, men, and urban workers feel better protected, other things being equal. Having an alternative income source in a form of pension or second job serves as an additional protection. These effects do not come as a surprise. The effects of job characteristics seem to be less obvious. Working at a small or medium-sized firm weakens fears, though employment in small firms is usually more flexible and less protected. The effect of state ownership is ambiguous, but it is small even if it is protective. We cannot exclude the possibility that more fearful workers preselect themselves into better-protected jobs. If sorting of this type actually takes place, the observed level of fear is lower than it otherwise could be. We also confirm the findings which were noted earlier in other papers on Russia and which diverge from the findings on other countries (that women tend to express stronger fears and that the fearfulness increases with tenure).
Our most striking finding is that the fear of unemployment on the Russian labour market is hardly associated with actual unemployment. One could expect that subjective perceptions should reflect fluctuations of unemployment rates. In fact, they are usually closely associated in the OECD countries, but in Russia this association does not exist. Having estimated various 25 In Linz and Semykina (2008, p. 452), a twofold increase in regional unemployment (from 6% to 12%) the conditional In the meantime, high and persistent fears may have important politico-economic implications. Reforming labour market institutions should lead to more efficient allocation and utilization of labour, but involves further deregulation. Given the strong fear of unemployment in the population, these reforms may face additional resistance. Moreover, there is, and probably, will be social and political pressure for stricter job protection and, therefore, against labour market reform. If unemployment has little impact on subjective job protection, then a decrease in unemployment will not open a political window for labour market deregulation. Politicians reacting to subjective perceptions of voters are likely to freeze economic reforms if these reforms cause more labour market volatility. Therefore, the workers' fear of unemployment becomes the politicians' fear and may stimulate the government to populist political actions. This, in turn, threatens to further reduce the number of protected jobs, thus causing even stronger fear. Notes: 1) Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and clusterisation are in parentheses; 2) *** -significance at 1% level; ** -significance at 5% level; *-significance at 10% level; 3) Controls: occupations, federal districts and years; 4) Estimates for constants and cut points are available on request. (0.033) Notes: 1) Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and clusterisation are in parentheses; 2) *** -significance at 1% level; ** -significance at 5% level; *-significance at 10% level; 3) All variables mentioned in Table 4 are controlled; 4) Estimates for constants and cut points are available on request. Notes: 1) Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and clusterisation are in parentheses; 2) *** -significance at 1% level; ** -significance at 5% level; *-significance at 10% level; 3) Controls: occupations, federal districts and years; 4) Estimates for constants and cut points are available on request. 2) *** -significance at 1% level; ** -significance at 5% level; *-significance at 10% level; 3) All variables mentioned in Table 4 are controlled; 4) Estimates for constants and cut points are available on request. 2) *** -significance at 1% level; ** -significance at 5% level; *-significance at 10% level; 3) All variables mentioned in Table 4 are controlled; 4) Estimates for constants and cut points are available on request. -0.004 (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) Notes: 1) Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and clusterisation are in parentheses; 2) *** -significance at 1% level; ** -significance at 5% level; *-significance at 10% level; 3) All variables mentioned in Table 4 are controlled; 4) Estimates for constants and cut points are available on request. Notes: the first group in each round bracket represents a reference group, while the second one represents a group which is compared with a reference group. For example, "second job (yes\no)" means that the average probability to choose value "5" for those who have a second job is compared to the average probability for those who do not. In the case of second job, a positive difference in the average probabilities means that absence of a second job increases the probability to choose value "5". fear to lose a job(cond.) Fig. 6 . Effects of different factors on the probability to choose value "5" (very concerned) when answering the question on the fear of not finding a new job.
Appendix: Tables and Charts
Notes: the first group in each round bracket represents a reference group, while the second one represents a group which is compared with a reference group. For example, "second job (yes\no)" means that the average probability to choose value "5" for those who have a second job is compared to the average probability for those who do not. In the case of second job, a positive difference in the average probabilities means that absence of a second job increases the probability to choose value "5".
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